[Update] Grenfell Tower report published

Originally Posted by Pierre

There are only 3 words that jump out to me from that snippet.

and they are

Those 3 words are further expanded upon in the article

When prime minister David Cameron’s coalition government embarked on a drive to cut red tape, it dominated the department’s thinking at the expense of safety issues, which were “ignored, delayed or disregarded”.

Pickles, who served as secretary of state in the department from 2010 to 2015, was described as an “ardent supporter” of deregulation. Civil servants felt pressure to cut red tape and building officials felt unable to refer concerns.

Pickles gave evidence to the inquiry that he would have thought it “ludicrous” that officials believed that deregulation applied to building regulations. But Moore-Bick concluded that he had been “unable to accept his evidence on that question” after it was flatly contradicted by his own officials and documents.

A succession of ministers and officials failed to foster a culture in which concerns about serious risks could be raised, which was a “serious failure of leadership”.

Damning in every direction. Wow.

[nomadking]

The Celotex insulation was listed on the RIBA website as being suitable for high-rise buildings. I checked at the time. If you were an architect, you would see that and use it. The snag is that was a caveat where the flammable insulation had to be encased in non-combustible material to keep it safe and avoid spreading of any fire.

Originally Posted by nomadking

The Celotex insulation was listed on the RIBA website as being suitable for high-rise buildings. I checked at the time. If you were an architect, you would see that and use it. The snag is that was a caveat where the flammable insulation had to be encased in non-combustible material to keep it safe and avoid spreading of any fire.

The snag really is that the supplier conducted tests and presented data in a way that actively obfuscated the dangers and limitations of the product. If they still have a presence in the UK, I suspect they are about to get sued to within an inch of their lives.

Originally Posted by nomadking

The Celotex insulation was listed on the RIBA website as being suitable for high-rise buildings. I checked at the time. If you were an architect, you would see that and use it. The snag is that was a caveat where the flammable insulation had to be encased in non-combustible material to keep it safe and avoid spreading of any fire.

Because Celotex lied…

In an attempt to break into the lucrative high-rise housing market, Ipswich-based manufacturer Celotex embarked on a “dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market”, Moore-Bick concluded. It tested its insulation behind non-combustible cladding, reinforced with additional fire-resisting boards — but did not mention the boards in the test report.

The test had been “manipulated”, Moore-Bick said, with Celotex only later revealing key details about its product “deliberately” tucked away in the small print of its literature.

Celotex presented its product to Harley Facades, the cladding subcontractor, as “suitable and safe” for Grenfell “although it knew that was not the case”, the report said.

[nomadking]

Originally Posted by Hugh

Because Celotex lied…

They DID mention how it was meant to be used on the RIBA website and other places. How else do you think I knew about it?
Any architects would just see it on a list of materials and it was claimed to be the only one suitable for high rise buildings.
It was(probably still is) used all over the place in lower-rise buildings, including houses. The height limit for that type of product was based upon the reach of Fire and Rescue ladders. In the US, that limit was different.
Too much focus on the cladding, when it even if it had been made of solidified napalm, it wouldn't have gone up like that. It was too thin, compared to the 10cm and 15cm thick insulation. The identified risk of burning cladding, was of dripping downwards, not going upwards.
The open purge panels(to let large amounts of air in or out) gave the internal fire access to the exterior insulation.
Any mention of the level of illegal sub-letting and the excess of electrical appliances(fridge/freezers, cookers etc)? The picture of the flat which was the source of the fire, had an excess of electrical appliances.

Originally Posted by nomadking

They DID mention how it was meant to be used on the RIBA website and other places. How else do you think I knew about it?
Any architects would just see it on a list of materials and it was claimed to be the only one suitable for high rise buildings.
It was(probably still is) used all over the place in lower-rise buildings, including houses. The height limit for that type of product was based upon the reach of Fire and Rescue ladders. In the US, that limit was different.
Too much focus on the cladding, when it even if it had been made of solidified napalm, it wouldn't have gone up like that. It was too thin, compared to the 10cm and 15cm thick insulation. The identified risk of burning cladding, was of dripping downwards, not going upwards.
The open purge panels(to let large amounts of air in or out) gave the internal fire access to the exterior insulation.
Any mention of the level of illegal sub-letting and the excess of electrical appliances(fridge/freezers, cookers etc)? The picture of the flat which was the source of the fire, had an excess of electrical appliances.

Amazing. Six years, £173,000,000 and 1,700 pages, when all along they should have just asked you.

You’re the very definition of contrarian.

Originally Posted by nomadking

They DID mention how it was meant to be used on the RIBA website and other places. How else do you think I knew about it?
Any architects would just see it on a list of materials and it was claimed to be the only one suitable for high rise buildings.
It was(probably still is) used all over the place in lower-rise buildings, including houses. The height limit for that type of product was based upon the reach of Fire and Rescue ladders. In the US, that limit was different.
Too much focus on the cladding, when it even if it had been made of solidified napalm, it wouldn't have gone up like that. It was too thin, compared to the 10cm and 15cm thick insulation. The identified risk of burning cladding, was of dripping downwards, not going upwards.
The open purge panels(to let large amounts of air in or out) gave the internal fire access to the exterior insulation.
Any mention of the level of illegal sub-letting and the excess of electrical appliances(fridge/freezers, cookers etc)? The picture of the flat which was the source of the fire, had an excess of electrical appliances.

Dude, you’re embarrassing yourself…

https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/how-grenf...ults-to-break/

The report contained damning details of Celotex's attempt to dominate the market, labelling its cladding the "first" to "successfully" pass the test.

The test in question involved “two sets of fire-resistant magnesium oxide boards placed in critical positions to ensure that it passed”.

The test report was found to have “omitted any reference to the magnesium oxide boards, thereby rendering it materially incomplete and misleading”.

Celotex then marketed RS5000 as “acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height”.

However, only later did it transpire that these results had been widely manipulated.

https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org...E-Laying_0.pdf Page 11



From volume 2 of the Phase 2 report page 366

https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org...3%20SEPT_0.pdf

The next page of the Compliance Guide contained a description of the system tested together with a diagram, Figure 4.

The following components were listed:
a. 12mm Fibre Cement Panels;
b. Supporting aluminium brackets and vertical rails;
c. 100mm Celotex RS5000; d. 12mm non‑combustible sheathing board;
e. 100mm SFS system; and
f. 2 x 12.5mm plasterboard.1486 24.112

The description did not disclose either the presence of the 6mm magnesium oxide boards nor the 8mm Marley Eternit boards. Although the text goes on to warn that “the fire performance and classification report issued only relates to the components detailed and constructed in Figure 4” and that “any changes to the components listed and construction method set out in Figure 4 will need to be considered by the building designer”, Figure 4 also omitted any reference to those elements. They had been omitted because, as Mr Evans admitted, any reference to them would have revealed that the system tested had been entirely unrepresentative of a commercial construction.

The failure to refer to the 6mm magnesium oxide boards or the 8mm Eternit boards completely undermined the disclaimers on pages 3 and 4. If the description of the system tested was materially incomplete, as it was, even the most rigorous attempt to reproduce it was bound to fail. In its statements to the Inquiry Celotex was at pains to point out that the statements that RS5000 was suitable for use on buildings over 18 metres in height should be read in the context of the disclaimer on page 3 of the Compliance Guide, but the disclaimer was effectively meaningless, as Celotex well knew.

Page 369

Mr Roome accepted with hindsight that the Specification Guide was a thoroughly misleading document, and that a reader might have interpreted the claim that RS5000 was suitable for use on buildings over 18 metres in height as meaning it could be used generally above that height. The document was indeed thoroughly misleading and, although Mr Roome himself may not have realised it, had been deliberately crafted to mislead the reader into buying RS5000 for use on buildings over 18 metres in height without worrying about whether the external wall of which it was to form part was the same as that which had been tested. The disclaimer on page 5 that the fire performance and classification report related only to the components listed was not only buried away in the small print but was, as we have explained, itself disingenuous because the components of the system tested had not been fully described.

[papa smurf]

Originally Posted by nomadking

They DID mention how it was meant to be used on the RIBA website and other places. How else do you think I knew about it?
Any architects would just see it on a list of materials and it was claimed to be the only one suitable for high rise buildings.
It was(probably still is) used all over the place in lower-rise buildings, including houses. The height limit for that type of product was based upon the reach of Fire and Rescue ladders. In the US, that limit was different.
Too much focus on the cladding, when it even if it had been made of solidified napalm, it wouldn't have gone up like that. It was too thin, compared to the 10cm and 15cm thick insulation. The identified risk of burning cladding, was of dripping downwards, not going upwards.
The open purge panels(to let large amounts of air in or out) gave the internal fire access to the exterior insulation.
Any mention of the level of illegal sub-letting and the excess of electrical appliances(fridge/freezers, cookers etc)? The picture of the flat which was the source of the fire, had an excess of electrical appliances.

Was the source of the fire an electrical appliance ?

Originally Posted by papa smurf

Was the source of the fire an electrical appliance ?

Even if it was, Grenfell Tower as originally designed could not have gone up like a roman candle thanks to it being built almost entirely of non-flammable materials. It is the addition of flammable material to the exterior of the tower that permitted an extensive fire, risking safety to those beyond the flat where it began.

[nomadking]

By itself, it wasn't safe. They never claimed it should be used by itself. I'm taking about the info at the time, not stuff that got deleted/removed.

From 7 years ago In post #300.

Originally Posted by nomadking

Facts:- The manufacturers made claims that it could used above 18m. Suppliers reiterated that. It was even listed in the product selector part of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) website. The design of how the insulation was to be used was bad, regardless of what type was used. I looked at the plans. No fire barriers between the window frames and the insulation.

From the Celotex website.

On the face of it, no reason to suggest it was the wrong product to use.

It is only when you read in further in another document you get this.

As for the suggestion of cost cutting being a factor, I also checked and compared prices. For one supplier as an example the FR5000 in the original plans would currently cost £755.32 for 23.04sq m but the RS5000 that was used(confirmed by the manufacturer) is £1282.65 for 23.04sq m. That is 70% more.

IIRC they even had example diagrams of panels where it was encased in non-flammable materials in order to prevent any spreading of fire.
Even a building of a mere 18m in height could've been destroyed by similar LEGAL materials.
IIRC the fire started below 18m, so more than one flat would've been affected whatever way you look at it. Other similar flammable insulation was LEGAL for use below 18m, and was originally in the plans.

Originally Posted by nomadking

By itself, it wasn't safe. They never claimed it should be used by itself. I'm taking about the info at the time, not stuff that got deleted/removed.

From 7 years ago In post #300.
IIRC they even had example diagrams of panels where it was encased in non-flammable materials in order to prevent any spreading of fire.
Even a building of a mere 18m in height could've been destroyed by similar LEGAL materials.
IIRC the fire started below 18m, so more than one flat would've been affected whatever way you look at it. Other similar flammable insulation was LEGAL for use below 18m, and was originally in the plans.

But they lied about the tests, never mentioning the additional materials that were used to pass the test, even in the diagrams…

The next page of the Compliance Guide contained a description of the system tested together with a diagram, Figure 4.

The following components were listed:
a. 12mm Fibre Cement Panels;
b. Supporting aluminium brackets and vertical rails;
c. 100mm Celotex RS5000; d. 12mm non‑combustible sheathing board;
e. 100mm SFS system; and
f. 2 x 12.5mm plasterboard.1486 24.112

The description did not disclose either the presence of the 6mm magnesium oxide boards nor the 8mm Marley Eternit boards. Although the text goes on to warn that “the fire performance and classification report issued only relates to the components detailed and constructed in Figure 4” and that “any changes to the components listed and construction method set out in Figure 4 will need to be considered by the building designer”, Figure 4 also omitted any reference to those elements. They had been omitted because, as Mr Evans admitted, any reference to them would have revealed that the system tested had been entirely unrepresentative of a commercial construction.

The failure to refer to the 6mm magnesium oxide boards or the 8mm Eternit boards completely undermined the disclaimers on pages 3 and 4. If the description of the system tested was materially incomplete, as it was, even the most rigorous attempt to reproduce it was bound to fail. In its statements to the Inquiry Celotex was at pains to point out that the statements that RS5000 was suitable for use on buildings over 18 metres in height should be read in the context of the disclaimer on page 3 of the Compliance Guide, but the disclaimer was effectively meaningless, as Celotex well knew.

[Pierre]

Originally Posted by Chris

I suspect they are about to get sued to within an inch of their lives

“Sued”…………! Corporate Manslaughter. There has to be a criminal investigation off the back off this.

---------- Post added at 18:19 ---------- Previous post was at 18:10 ----------

However, now reading Nomadkings posts, and assuming he is an architect or works in that field.

I understand what he is saying and potentially withdraw my Corporate Manslaughter claim.

Celotex was never rated as fire resistant.

It was only ever intended to be used as part of a cladding system that incorporated fire resistant materials in which it was enclosed.

The British Standard quoted is a standard for a system of cladding, of which celotex would only be a component. To meet that standard the fire resistant encasing would be required and the designer of the cladding system would /should specify that.

So it’s not as clear as being reported, and if criminal charges were ever brought a good barrister would probably drive a bus through these accusations.

Thank you nomadking.

Originally Posted by Pierre

“Sued”…………! Corporate Manslaughter. There has to be a criminal investigation off the back off this.

---------- Post added at 18:19 ---------- Previous post was at 18:10 ----------

However, now reading Nomadkings posts, and assuming he is an architect or works in that field.

I understand what he is saying and potentially withdraw my Corporate Manslaughter claim.

Celotex was never rated as fire resistant.

It was only ever intended to be used as part of a cladding system that incorporated fire resistant materials in which it was enclosed.

The British Standard quoted is a standard for a system of cladding, of which celotex would only be a component. To meet that standard the fire resistant encasing would be required and the designer of the cladding system would /should specify that.

So it’s not as clear as being reported, and if criminal charges were ever brought a good barrister would probably drive a bus through these accusations.

Thank you nomadking.

Well that’s the problem right there isn’t it, and the reason why you need to be careful about what you take from the posts of a random internet user with a penchant for contrarianism, even if he has experience in the field (and I’ve seen nothing so far to suggest he is anything other than an enthusiastic amateur, just like the rest of us).

These aren’t just accusations - the report contains findings of fact drawn from witness testimony gathered under oath. The inquiry report isn’t a judgment or even an accusation, but its findings really aren’t going to be so easy to drive a bus through.

[peanut]

Speaking of Celotex. Just before lockdown my wife was headhunted to work for them on a rolling contract to go through their quality systems. My wife is a certified ISO auditor, 35 years experience in quality control and a member of the Chartered Quality Institute (CQI). Obviously to say she turned them down as she didn't want a stain on her CV.