Quote:
Originally Posted by jonbxx
Agreed, the way that the EMA works with having a multilevel approval process (drug approval, market approval, country approval) just isn't nimble enough in an emergency situation. The 'big bloc' approach definitely drove the costs down but, in this case, money pretty much wasn't an issue.
I was having a look earlier on what vaccines were ordered and possibly why and there's no consistent theme to explain the difference between the decisions the UK and EU made (if we take any suggestion of vaccine nationalism out of the equation) The main vaccine types are;
mRNA - the biggest unknown in that these have never been really used as drugs but really simple and quick to test
Pfizer/BioNTech - UK 40m, EU 600m
Moderna - UK 17m, EU 160m
Curevac - UK 50m, EU 405m
Adenovirus - bit more tested/known technology
AZ/Oxford - UK 100m, EU 400m
Janssen - UK 30m, EU 400m
Inactivated virus/virus subunits - classic vaccine, safest bet but the longest lead time
GSK/Sanofi - UK 60m, EU 300m
Novavax - UK 60m, EU 200m
Valneva - UK 100m, EU 60m
There's no real big differences in the purchasing decisions. There are differences in the proportions of each vaccine contracted between the UK and EU but no fundamental differences in what was ordered - the UK and EU bet on the same horses. It seems that speed was the winner here rather than betting on the wrong things.
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The purchasing decisions in the UK and the EU were both fundamentally sound. There are a range of vaccine types from a range of companies with varying experience. The difference between the two lies in their non-healthcare related policy aims. The EU’s decision to act on behalf of member states, whatever else it was meant to achieve, was an attempt at a deliberate post-Brexit display of the superiority of the EU’s concept of pooled sovereignty. All would benefit from the strength of the biggest members, and the power of the whole would secure the lowest prices and the most favourable terms.
Meanwhile in the UK, where for whatever reason we have not been very good at curbing the spread of the virus or stopping it from killing a lot of people, the overriding policy aim has been getting hold of lots of vaccines quickly. That led HMG to veto Oxford University’s intention to give its vaccine formula to an American manufacturer due to concerns over whether it could then be banned from export back to the UK by the Trump administration, and its strong urging that they choose a company that could manufacture in the UK. It also led HMG to prioritise rapid conclusion of deals over price, although its involvement in the Oxford-AstraZeneca tie-up has allowed it to negotiate at-cost terms for the duration of the pandemic.
It seems unlikely that the EU would have been able to directly intervene in the production process in the way we have done, although ensuring domestic production is less of an issue as they already have several sites in EU member states dedicated to that. The bigger issue for the EU is that trying to devise a system by which states could act together has taken time, acting in an unfamiliar policy area has taken time, and trying to prove the power of the EU by negotiating hard on price, delivery terms, IP rights etc has taken time. The EU has been let down by its inefficient bureaucracy and by focusing on political symbolism rather than on an unfolding public health crisis.
Hence why, if you take vaccine nationalism out of the equation, you can’t understand the disparity of performance. It was an attempt to deal in European nationalism that has put them in this mess.