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**Hugh** · 04-09-2024, 16:57

Quote:

Originally Posted by nomadking

They DID mention how it was meant to be used on the RIBA website and other places. How else do you think I knew about it?
Any architects would just see it on a list of materials and it was claimed to be the only one suitable for high rise buildings.
It was(probably still is) used all over the place in lower-rise buildings, including houses. The height limit for that type of product was based upon the reach of Fire and Rescue ladders. In the US, that limit was different.
Too much focus on the cladding, when it even if it had been made of solidified napalm, it wouldn't have gone up like that. It was too thin, compared to the 10cm and 15cm thick insulation. The identified risk of burning cladding, was of dripping downwards, not going upwards.
The open purge panels(to let large amounts of air in or out) gave the internal fire access to the exterior insulation.
Any mention of the level of illegal sub-letting and the excess of electrical appliances(fridge/freezers, cookers etc)? The picture of the flat which was the source of the fire, had an excess of electrical appliances.

Dude, you’re embarrassing yourself…

https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/how-grenf...ults-to-break/

Quote:

The report contained damning details of Celotex's attempt to dominate the market, labelling its cladding the "first" to "successfully" pass the test.

The test in question involved “two sets of fire-resistant magnesium oxide boards placed in critical positions to ensure that it passed”.

The test report was found to have “omitted any reference to the magnesium oxide boards, thereby rendering it materially incomplete and misleading”.

Celotex then marketed RS5000 as “acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height”.

However, only later did it transpire that these results had been widely manipulated.

https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org...E-Laying_0.pdf Page 11

From volume 2 of the Phase 2 report page 366

https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org...3%20SEPT_0.pdf

Quote:

The next page of the Compliance Guide contained a description of the system tested together with a diagram, Figure 4.

The following components were listed:
a. 12mm Fibre Cement Panels;
b. Supporting aluminium brackets and vertical rails;
c. 100mm Celotex RS5000; d. 12mm non‑combustible sheathing board;
e. 100mm SFS system; and
f. 2 x 12.5mm plasterboard.1486 24.112

The description did not disclose either the presence of the 6mm magnesium oxide boards nor the 8mm Marley Eternit boards. Although the text goes on to warn that “the fire performance and classification report issued only relates to the components detailed and constructed in Figure 4” and that “any changes to the components listed and construction method set out in Figure 4 will need to be considered by the building designer”, Figure 4 also omitted any reference to those elements. They had been omitted because, as Mr Evans admitted, any reference to them would have revealed that the system tested had been entirely unrepresentative of a commercial construction.

The failure to refer to the 6mm magnesium oxide boards or the 8mm Eternit boards completely undermined the disclaimers on pages 3 and 4. If the description of the system tested was materially incomplete, as it was, even the most rigorous attempt to reproduce it was bound to fail. In its statements to the Inquiry Celotex was at pains to point out that the statements that RS5000 was suitable for use on buildings over 18 metres in height should be read in the context of the disclaimer on page 3 of the Compliance Guide, but the disclaimer was effectively meaningless, as Celotex well knew.

Page 369

Quote:

Mr Roome accepted with hindsight that the Specification Guide was a thoroughly misleading document, and that a reader might have interpreted the claim that RS5000 was suitable for use on buildings over 18 metres in height as meaning it could be used generally above that height. The document was indeed thoroughly misleading and, although Mr Roome himself may not have realised it, had been deliberately crafted to mislead the reader into buying RS5000 for use on buildings over 18 metres in height without worrying about whether the external wall of which it was to form part was the same as that which had been tested. The disclaimer on page 5 that the fire performance and classification report related only to the components listed was not only buried away in the small print but was, as we have explained, itself disingenuous because the components of the system tested had not been fully described.